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This paper demonstrates that the decisions by workers of diﬀerent skills to unite
to form industry unions is closely linked to the egalitarian wage policies that such
unions pursue. These results help interpret the stylized facts about unions: that
they not only increase wages but also reduce wage inequality. I also demonstrate
that political caps on collectively negotiated minimum wages may reduce the wages
of all blue-collar workers (cf. “internal devaluation”), but that they may also cause
unions to disintegrate in the long run.
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1 Introduction
The main result of this paper is that workers of diﬀerent skills unite to form an industry
union if, and only if, such a union would pursue an egalitarian wage policy. I derive
this result in a model where the distinguishing feature of an industry union is its ability
to reallocate bargaining power between its diﬀerent skill groups. This ability may be a
strength, by conferring a strategic advantage vis-à-vis the employers. But it may also be
a weakness, by exposing minorities to majority opportunism.
Suﬃciency Sometimes, industry unions can redirect the bargaining power of skilled
workers to increase the lowest wages and rely on the employers to voluntarily increase
higher wages by the same amounts. The condition is that the employers need to maintain
wage diﬀerences to protect firm productivity. If these “domino eﬀects” are strong enough,
relative to union bargaining power, an egalitarian wage policy will result in a higher
wage for the skilled workers, both compared to the wage negotiated by a separate crafts
union, and compared to the wage negotiated by an industry union with a skill-biased wage
policy.1 The skilled workers would then prefer forming an industry union to a separate
craft union. And, once the industry union has been formed, they would also vote in favor
of an egalitarian wage policy. Unskilled workers clearly prefer an industry union, when
they know that such a union will focus all its bargaining power on the lowest wages.
Thus, whenever domino eﬀects are suﬃciently strong for an industry union to pursue an
egalitarian wage policy, such a union will be formed.
Necessity Once a democratic organization has been formed, any minority is exposed
to the opportunism by the majority. This is also true for the least productive minority
in an industry union. When the more productive majority has a strategic (or ideological)
interest in pursuing an egalitarian wage policy, opportunism is clearly not a problem.
Opportunism is a problem, however, when the majority does not have such an interest.
The majority can then use the combined bargaining power of all workers to mainly enrich
itself. Even the slightest bias in the wage policy in favor of the median worker means that
the lowest wages would be set below the level negotiated by a separate union representing
only the least productive labor. The least productive members then prefer to form an
independent skill-specific union. Thus, whenever domino eﬀects are not suﬃciently strong
for an industry union to pursue an egalitarian wage policy, such a union will not be formed.
Application 1: Eﬀects of unions on wage inequality A large empirical literature
suggests that unions not only increase wages but that they also reduce wage inequality.
1The details of the comparison of the diﬀerent policies within an industry union are presented in a
companion paper (Stennek, 2015). The present paper focuses on the coalition formation aspects.
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They reduce wage diﬀerences associated with skills, education and tenure, both between
and within firms and plants.2 Since unions primarily raise the lower tail of the wage
distribution,3 the unions’ equity concerns appear to reach far beyond the median member’s
immediate self interest. However, also pure inequity aversion is an unlikely explanation
since skilled workers are less supportive of union representation.4
The present paper argues that industry unions, when they are formed, will pursue
egalitarian wage policies and, thus, reduce wage inequality. The reason is that the median
worker may have a strategic interest in increasing the lowest wages. In contrast, I show
that crafts unions, which divide labor according to skills, may increase or decrease wage
inequality, depending on the circumstances.
This predicted diﬀerence between the two organizational forms suggests that also
empirical studies of unions should make the same distinction. Actually, Ozanne’s (1962)
study of skill diﬀerentials in a single firm over a period of 100 years did so. During
this time, the pattern of unionization varied. During periods when workers belonged
to the same industry union wage diﬀerences became smaller but during periods when
workers were divided into crafts unions wage diﬀerences increased. This pattern is clearly
consistent with the predictions of the present paper.
Application 2: Caps on minimum wages in Europe Is a lower minimum wage part
of the cure for the current economic problems in Europe? The International Monetary
Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission believe so. The so-
called troika demanded that Greece – the country worst oﬀ – cut its minimum wage by
20 percent as part of the conditions for a new financing package (Bloomberg, 2012). In
Greece minimum wages are negotiated by the social partners before being turned into
law and a Greek minister resigned arguing that the lenders “in a blackmailing way are
crushing the edifice of labor relations" (The Guardian, 2012).
To understand what role minimum wages play in Europe, it is vital to understand how
they are determined through collective negotiations. Such procedures is the norm in large
parts of Europe, including Greece and Sweden but also e.g. Germany and Italy (Skedinger,
2012). Unfortunately, however, almost all research on minimum wages concern countries
such as the United States and Canada where minimum wage levels are determined by
lawmakers (Neumark and Wascher, 2007). This paper starts filling this gap.
My results indicate that a politically imposed cap on collectively negotiated minimum
2The exact numbers depend on the country, the time period and the methodology used. See reviews
by Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984), Kaufaman (2002), Blanchflower and Bryson (2003) and Card, Lemieux
and Ridell (2004). Recent studies, emphasizing causality, use a regression discontinuity design based on
union certification elections and compare the outcomes in establishments where unions barely won with
those where unions barely lost. See DiNardo and Lee (2004), Lee and Mas (2009) and Frandsen (2011).
3This feature was first noted by Freeman (1980). For a recent study based on a regression discontinuity
design, see Frandsen (2011).
4See Farber and Saks (1980) and Parsons (1982).
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wages may be a tool for reducing blue-collar wages in general. When the lowest wages are
reduced, the employers can also reduce the wages further up in the distribution without
compromising eﬃciency. Such a partial “internal devaluation” may well be a consequence
intended by the troika. But my results nevertheless call for caution. First, if a reduction of
blue-collar wages creates an opportunity for white-collar workers to increase their rents,
the firms’ wage costs may remain high. Second, if the unions pursue egalitarian wage
policies for strategic reasons, a cap on the collectively negotiated minimum wage may
threaten the unity among blue-collar workers in the long run.
2 Relation to previous literature
Previous theoretical research on union formation is focused on the eﬀect of union structure
on the wage level.5 Amain result is that diﬀerent groups of workers can sometimes increase
the wage share by forming a common industry union rather than separate crafts unions.
In particular, an industry union increases worker bargaining strength if the workers are
substitutes in production, but not if they are complements (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988).
But since the empirical literature suggests that unions reduce wage inequality among
their members, in addition to increasing the wage level, it is important to understand
why industry unions pursue egalitarian wage policies and how this choice interacts with
union formation. The present paper shows that an industry union’s ability to pursue
an egalitarian wage policy may constitute another gain from unity, i.e. an egalitarian
wage policy may actually increase the wage share. (In the present model, the workers are
neither substitutes nor complements in order to eliminate the Horn-Wolinsky eﬀect.)
Moreover, previous research on union formation has not dealt with the issue of op-
portunism and minority protection, presumably as a result of its focus on the wage level.
Horn and Wolinsky assume that diﬀerent worker groups will always find a way to share
any surplus created by forming an industry union. Jun (1989) models this process in
detail.6 He assumes that an industry union can commit to a wage policy already when
it is formed and that this policy is determined through bargaining between the worker
groups. Jun does also not discuss the strategic role of the union wage policy, i.e. how
diﬀerent relative wage policies aﬀect the wage level. The relative wage is simply seen as
a tool for splitting the surplus between the worker groups. In addition, Jun assumes that
the union itself can decide on the wage diﬀerences in the economy and that it only has to
bargain with the employers over the wage level.
But even if an industry union has the potential to increase the overall wage share,
5See Booth (1984), Horn andWollinsky (1988) and Jun (1989). Also research where the union structure
(and the locus of bargaining, i.e. centralization vs. decentralization) is exogenous has been exclusively
concerned with eﬀects on the wage level (Dowrick, 1990).
6Booth assume that all workers have the same productivity and must receive the same wage. (Workers
only diﬀer in their views on unemployment.)
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for one reason or the other, it is not clear that heterogenous workers can unite, when
they have diverging interests over the division of the wage share. Any minority may fear
that, once an industry union has been formed, the majority would use the additional
bargaining strength to not only bash the employers but also to exploit the minority.
While the pattern of unionization evolves slowly, union wage policies can be changed
more easily between the years. The adequate modeling strategy is therefore to require an
industry union’s wage policy to be decided after it has been formed. And since unions
are democratic organizations, the ex post right to decide resides with the median member
who is assumed to be skilled. The present paper demonstrates that, in the presence of
domino eﬀects, an egalitarian wage policy not only increases the wage share but also
protects minorities from exploitation by the majority.
3 Model
The paper uses the same model as in Stennek (2015) extended with a coalition formation
stage. The timing of events is described in figure 1. First, the workers decide whether to
Figure 1: Time Line
Time1 2 4
unions
Workers apply for jobs
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form a common industry union or skill-specific crafts unions (section 5). For simplicity
there are only two types of (blue-collar) workers called unskilled (“the least productive”)
and skilled (“everybody else”). To abstract from any collective action problems within the
groups it may be assumed that the workers are already organized in two crafts unions and
that the issue is whether to merge these unions into a single industry union. Alternatively,
it may be assumed that there is an industry union and that the issue is whether this union
should be braked up. In any case, it is assumed that there will be an industry union if, and
only if, both groups of workers prefer an industry union to two separate unions. Second, if
an industry union is formed, the workers vote for a wage policy. The wage policy describes
the union’s preferences over wages in diﬀerent jobs. This choice may also be thought
of as electing the union leadership, which is responsible for the wage negotiations with
the employers (section 4.3). To study why industry unions favor their least productive
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minorities, it is assumed that there are more skilled than unskilled workers. Crafts unions
simply maximize the utility of their representative member. Third, the union(s) and the
single firm bargain over the wages (section 4.3). Statutory minimum wages, if any, are
not binding. Fourth, the workers decide which type of job they wish to apply for and the
firms hire all applicants for which the expected profit is positive. The model is analyzed
backwards, to establish a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
The model abstracts from important arguments against increased wage costs. Indi-
vidual firms are not put at a competitive disadvantage by increased wages. There is also
no unemployment in equilibrium, nor any possibility for inflation.
3.1 Job applications and hiring
The present section analyzes the fourth stage, job applications and hiring. The key
property of this part of the model is that wage diﬀerences increase the firms’ productivity.
To make it simple, there are only two levels of productivity: productivity is high if the
diﬀerence between the wages earned by skilled and unskilled workers exceeds a threshold;
otherwise it is low. To be concrete, I use an adverse selection model. But the same formal
model may be interpreted many diﬀerent ways, as discussed in Stennek (2015).
Production There are two types of jobs or techniques. Every worker who takes a “basic”
job adds the value vL to the firm and every worker who takes an “advanced” job adds the
value vH > vL. The total value of production is simply the sum of values produced by the
workers. For example, if all workers, skilled and unskilled, carry out basic jobs, the total
value is vL. But, if all the skilled workers carry out advanced jobs and all the unskilled
workers carry out basic jobs, the total value is higher and given by   · vL + (1   ) · vH ,
where   < 12 is the share of unskilled workers.
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Utility A worker’s disutility of eﬀort is an increasing and convex function of the value
produced. In particular, dji = di · (vj)2 for both skilled (i = S) and unskilled (i = U)
workers. (Note that sub-indexes are used to diﬀerentiate worker types and super-indexes
are used to diﬀerentiate jobs.) The disutility of eﬀort is higher for the unskilled workers’
than for the skilled workers, i.e. dU > dS. These assumptions entail that the usual “single
crossing” conditions for screening in adverse selection models are satisfied.8 The utility of
a worker of type i who takes a job of type j is given by u = wj dji , where wj is the wage in
job j. The utility outside employment is normalized to zero. Thus, the disutility of work
must be interpreted broadly to include e.g. the lost value of leisure and unemployment
benefits.
7Notice that the two groups of workers are neither substitutes nor complements since the value pro-
duced by the diﬀerent skill groups is independent of the presence of the other group.
8In particular, dLU > dLS and dHU   dLU > dHS   dLS , are satisfied.
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Eﬃciency The number of basic and advanced jobs are endogenous; they are deter-
mined by job applications and hiring decisions. Eﬃciency requires that the firms hire the
unskilled workers to carry out basic jobs if
vL   dLU > vH   dHU , (1)
and that the firms hire the skilled workers to carry out advanced jobs if
vH   dHS > vL   dLS . (2)




> dS, which is assumed.
The maximum total surplus is denoted by S = (1   ) ·  vH   dHS   +   ·  vL   dLU .
The increase of the total surplus if skilled workers are employed in advanced jobs rather
than in basic jobs is denoted by 4S = (1   ) · ⇥ vH   dHS     vL   dLS ⇤.
Information The firm and the union(s) bargain over the wages, wL and wH , but cannot
decide on employment directly. Individual workers have private information about their
skills and select which jobs they wish to apply for. The firm decides unilaterally what
applicants it wishes to hire, but without observing their skills. The outcome is eﬃcient
if the combination of wages induce all workers to apply for the jobs they are suited for,
while granting the firm a positive profit when hiring all applicants. In particular, the
wage schedule has to satisfy both rationality and incentive compatibility constraints for
both the workers and the firms.
Worker incentives The wages must compensate the workers for their disutility of work.
The wage paid for basic jobs has to compensate the unskilled workers for their disutility
of low eﬀort and the wage paid for diﬃcult jobs has to compensate the skilled workers for
their disutility of high eﬀort, i.e.
wL   dLU   0, (3)
wH   dHS   0. (4)
Unless these individual rationality constraints are fulfilled, the workers would prefer to
remain unemployed. Expressed diﬀerently, the wage schedule must lie above the IRS-line
and to the right of the IRU -line in figure 2, on page 9.
The wage structure must also induce the unskilled workers to voluntarily choose the
basic jobs over the advanced jobs and the skilled workers to prefer advanced jobs to basic
jobs, i.e.
wL   dLU   wH   dHU , (5)
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wH   dHS   wL   dLS . (6)
These incentive-compatibility constraints place restrictions on wage diﬀerences. The
skilled workers’ incentive-compatibility constraint (“ICS”) requires the wage for advanced
jobs to be suﬃciently high compared to the wage for basic jobs. Whatever the wage
for basic jobs is, the wage for advanced jobs must be larger and compensate the skilled
workers for the extra eﬀort required, i.e. wH   wL   dHS   dLS > 0. Expressed diﬀerently,
the wage schedule must lie above the ICS-line in figure 2. The incentive-compatibility
constraint for the unskilled workers will be excluded from now on, since it will not play
any role in the analysis to follow (think of dHU as extremely high).
Firm incentives The wage structure must grant the firm a non-negative profit. When
the eﬃcient outcome is implemented, the requirement is that ⇡ =   · vL   wL +(1   ) · 
vH   wH  is positive. The wage structure must also ensure that the firms wish to hire
both types of workers, i.e.
wH  vH (7)
wL  vL. (8)
These two right-to-manage constraints are described by the two dotted lines in figure 2.
Eﬃciency and division of surplus The gray area in figure 2, defined by inequali-
ties (3) - (8), represents all wage schedules inducing maximization of the total surplus.
While every such eﬃcient wage schedule maximizes the total surplus, they entail diﬀerent
divisions of this surplus between the firm and the diﬀerent types of workers.
4 Wage setting
4.1 Unilateral wage setting
First consider the case when no unions have been formed and the employer has the power
to set wages unilaterally. If the firm wishes to induce an an eﬃcient outcome, it will
choose the wage schedule described by the E-dot in figure 2 (which is the intersection of
the IRU and ICS lines) to minimize wage costs. Thus, the unskilled workers are simply
oﬀered a compensation for their disutility of work, i.e. wLE = dLU . The skilled workers are




, where the second term is a compensating wage diﬀerential,
to compensate the skilled workers for taking on more responsibility or acquiring a higher
education. Notice that the skilled workers receive a wage in excess of the level suﬃcient
to compensate them for their disutility of working:
uH = w
H





 ⇤  dHS = dLU   dLS ⌘ r > 0.
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This eﬃciency wage premium is paid by the firm to prevent the skilled workers from
accepting a low-paid low-eﬀort job. Therefore, the eﬃciency wage premium has to be
at least as high as the utility the skilled workers would derive from choosing a basic job
(wLE dHS = dLU  dLS). In figure 2 the eﬃciency wage premium is described by the distance
between the E-dot located on the incentive-compatibility constraint and the e-dot located
on the individual rationality constraint.
Stennek (2015) shows that the firm indeed has an incentive to implement the eﬃcient
outcome (rather than e.g. not oﬀering any low-eﬀort jobs) if
  ·  vL   dLU    (1   ) ·  dLU   dLS  . (9)
This condition requires that the unskilled workers’ contribution to total production (which
is equal to the left hand side of the inequality) is larger than the total eﬃciency wage
premium paid by the firm (which is equal to the right hand side of the inequality).
4.2 Collective negotiations with two crafts unions
When the workers in basic and advanced jobs are organized in two diﬀerent unions, the
two wages are determined in two separate collective negotiations. The natural modeling
strategy is to represent the two negotiations by two Nash bargaining problems. But even
if the two negotiations are separate, they are interdependent. The reason is that the
relative wage matters: the skilled workers may choose to apply for basic jobs in case the
wage in basic jobs is relatively high compared to the wage in advanced jobs. Thus, the
wage that the parties wish to agree upon in one negotiation may depend on the wage
agreed in the other negotiation. A natural extension of the Nash bargaining model to
handle such interdependence between the bilateral negotiations is to assume that the firm
and each job-specific union will choose the wage maximizing their Nash product, taking
the wage agreed in the other negotiation as given. One may call this a Nash equilibrium
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in Nash bargaining solutions.9
I will focus on eﬃcient equilibria. To do so, I first assume that skilled workers are
organized in the advanced-jobs union and that unskilled workers are organized in the
basic-jobs union. Then, I show that any equilibrium wage schedule indeed induces an eﬃ-
cient outcome, meaning that the skilled workers are hired in advanced jobs and unskilled
workers are hired in basic jobs.10
Negotiation with the advanced-jobs union Assume that, for some reason, the wage
for basic jobs is given by wL 2 ⇥dLU , vL⇤. Such a wage would compensate the unskilled
workers for the disutility of eﬀort in basic jobs and provide a surplus to the firm. Consider
now the firm’s negotiation with the advanced-jobs union. I represent this negotiation by
the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. The union’s objective is to maximize the wage
premium, which is given by wH   dHS , given that all workers in advanced jobs are skilled.
The union’s disagreement payoﬀ is zero. The firm’s objective is to maximize profit, which
is given by ⇡ =   ·  vL   wL  + (1   ) ·  vH   wH  given that skilled workers are hired
in advanced jobs and unskilled workers are hired in basic jobs. The firm’s payoﬀ in case








(1   ) ·  vH   wH ⇤1   ·  wH   dHS   
where   2 [0, 1] is the union’s bargaining power.
The task is to find the wage wH that will be agreed by the firm and the advanced-jobs
union, for any possible wL 2 ⇥dLU , vL⇤. This best-reply function is easy to describe. Given
that the advanced jobs workers are skilled, the firm and the union will agree on the wage
splitting the skilled surplus SH = vH   dHS in accordance with the parties bargaining
power. That is, they will agree on
wHNIC =   · vH + (1   ) · dHS , (10)





eﬃcient. The notation “NIC”
refers to the fact that this wage is the same as the wage that would be agreed with no
incentive-compatibility constraint. But if wL is so high that wHNIC would induce the skilled
workers to apply for basic jobs, the firm would agree to increase the wage for advanced
jobs above wHNIC . Then the agreement would stipulate the lowest level inducing the skilled
9The use of a Nash equilibrium in Nash bargaining solutions to describe the outcome of interdependent
bilateral negotiations was first suggested by Davidson (1988) and Horn and Wolinsky (1988b).
10The main benefit of focusing on eﬃcient equilibria is that then both unions have homogenous mem-
bers. Thus, their objective functions can simply be assumed to coincide with the members’ utility
function.
10





= dHS   dLS + wL. (11)




    vL wL, since vH vL   dHS  dLS which is guaranteed by condition (2). That
is, the firm can appropriate the eﬃciency gain, vH   vL, after paying the advanced-job,
i.e. skilled, workers a compensation for their extra eﬀort, dHS   dLS . In sum:
Lemma 1. Assume that the advanced-jobs union’s members are skilled. The firm and the








, given that the wage for basic
jobs is given by wL 2 ⇥dLU , vL⇤.
This best-reply function is illustrated by the thick line in figure 4a, assuming equal
bargaining power. Clearly the wage for advanced jobs is always set in the interval


























wH 2 ⇥wHE , vH⇤. The details are relegated to Appendix A.
Negotiation with the basic-jobs union Assume that the wage for advanced jobs is
given by wH 2 ⇥wHE , vH⇤, as suggested above. Consider now the firm’s negotiation with
the basic-jobs union. I represent this negotiation by the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution. The union’s objective is to maximize the wage premium, which is given by
wL   dLU , given that all workers in basic jobs are unskilled. The union’s disagreement
payoﬀ is zero. The firm’s objective is to maximize profit, which is given by ⇡ =   · 
vL   wL +(1   ) · vH   wH  given that skilled workers are hired in advanced jobs and
unskilled workers are hired in basic jobs. The firm’s payoﬀ in case of disagreement with







  ·  vL   wL ⇤1   ·  wH   dHS   
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where   2 [0, 1] is the union’s bargaining power.
The task is to find the wage wL that will be agreed by the firm and the basic-jobs
workers, for any possible wH 2 ⇥wHE , vH⇤. This best-reply function is depicted in figure 4b.
Given that the basic-jobs workers are unskilled, the firm and the union will agree on the
wage splitting the surplus SL = vL   dLU according to bargaining power, i.e. they will
agree on
wLNIC =   · vL + (1   ) · dLU , (12)
as long as this wage renders the wage schedule eﬃcient. But if the wage for advanced
jobs wH is suﬃciently low, wLNIC would induce skilled workers to migrate from advanced
jobs to basic jobs. Then, wLNIC would actually not split the true surplus created by the
agreement between the firm and the basic-jobs union equally. Therefore, the firm will be
able to force the basic-jobs workers to agree on a wage below wLNIC . If wH is moderately
low, the basic-jobs workers will agree on the highest wage inducing the skilled workers to





=    dHS   dLS + wH . (13)










defined in the Appendix. This “non-eﬃcient wage” is illustrated by the segment of the
best-reply function outside the eﬃcient set in figure 4b. However, a wage schedule below
ICS cannot be an equilibrium since the firm and the advanced-jobs workers always have
an incentive to raise wH to satisfy the ICS with equality. Therefore wLne cannot be part
of an equilibrium.
To sum up:
Lemma 2. Assume that the basic-jobs union’s members are unskilled. The firm and the












, given that the
wage for advanced jobs is given by wH 2 ⇥wHE , vH⇤.
The formal derivation of the best-reply function is relegated to Appendix B.
Bargaining equilibrium The remaining task is to combine the two best-reply func-
tions to find the overall bargaining equilibrium, i.e. the Nash equilibrium in Nash bar-







is the equilibrium whenever this wage schedule satisfies the





1    ·4S (14)
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which may or may not hold under the assumptions previously made in this paper. Such
a situation is depicted in figure 5a.



























If condition (14) is not satisfied, there exists a continuum of equilibrium wage schedules












in equilibrium. Either the firm will agree to increase the wage
of the advanced jobs, or the basic-jobs union will be forced to reduce their wage, or there
will be a combination of these two concessions.
In sum:
Lemma 3. Assume that skilled workers are organized in the advanced-jobs union and that
unskilled workers are organized in the basic-jobs union. There always exists an equilibrium













wH   wL = dHS   dLS
wH   wHNIC
wLne  wL  wLNIC
is an equilibrium.
It is not clear which equilibrium is most reasonable when condition 14 is not satisfied.
But, as it turns out, it is not necessary to select any specific equilibrium for the purpose
of this paper.
4.3 Collective negotiations with an industry union
The current section analyzes wage bargaining when there is an industrial union organizing
workers in both basic and advanced jobs. I assume that the union’s wage policy (i.e. its
13
objective function) attaches a weight ↵   0 on the basic-job workers’ wage premium and a
weight 1 ↵   0 on the advanced-job workers’ wage premium. That is, when the eﬃcient





= (1  ↵) ·  wH   dHS  + ↵ ·  wL   dLU  .
Wages are determined through collective bargaining between the union and the firm.
I represent this negotiation by the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. The firm’s





disagreement payoﬀ is zero for both the employer and the workers. The asymmetric Nash







 1   · U  wH , wL   where   2 [0, 1] is
the union’s bargaining power. The bargaining outcome is found by maximizing the Nash
product.
The equilibrium wage schedule which depends the union’s wage policy (↵) is illustrated
by the ↵-curve in figure 5. When the union is biased in favor of the median worker, i.e.


















↵ <  , the unique equilibrium is given by the eh-dot. When the union is unbiased, i.e.
when the weights in the union’s objective function coincides with the population shares
(↵ =  ) any point on the bold part of the ⇡NIC-line is an equilibrium. When the union
has egalitarian preferences, i.e. ↵ >  , the unique equilibrium lies on the bold part of
the IC-constraint. The higher ↵ is, the further to the right is the equilibrium. With an
extreme egalitarian wage policy, i.e. ↵ = 1, the equilibrium is given by the el-dot.
To understand this result, notice that the firm is willing to agree on any reallocation







 1 ↵ ·  wL   dLU ↵ . This formu-
lation gives rise to the essentially same results, but in a slightly less transparent way.
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of wages keeping the profit constant. That is, the firm is indiﬀerent between any wage
schedule along an iso-profit curve within the eﬃcient set. If the union is unbiased (↵ =  ),
also the union does not have any preferences over diﬀerent wage combinations on any given
iso-profit curve. The exact wage schedule is therefore indeterminate.12 The total wage
bill is determinate, however, and is given by (1   ) · wHNIC +   · wLNIC . All these wage
schedules lie on the bold part of the ⇡NIC-line in figure 5. That is, the wage share is
the same as under crafts unionism (when incentive-compatibility does not binding). This
result is a simple restatement of Horn’s and Wolinsky’s finding. They consider a union
maximizing the total wage bill and show that if the two groups of workers are neither
complements nor substitutes, as is the case here, then an industry union and two crafts
unions deliver the same total wage bill.
If the union is biased in favor of the median worker (↵ <  ), the union wishes to
maximize wH on any iso-profit curve. Then, IRU must bind in equilibrium, i.e. wL = dLU .
Maximizing the Nash product over wH yields the same solution independent of ↵ <  .
The solution must therefore coincide with the solution when the union only cares about
the skilled wage premium, ↵ = 0. The equilibrium wage schedule is illustrated by the
eh-dot in figure 5, for the case when the bargaining rent is larger than the information
rent ( 11   ·   · S > r). It is straight-forward to demonstrate that, in this case, the total
wage bill is given by (1   ) · wHNIC +   · wLNIC .
If the union has egalitarian preferences (↵ >  ), the union wishes to maximize wL on
any iso-profit curve. Thus, ICS binds in equilibrium (assuming that the union’s bargaining












S˜    wL   dLU i1   · ⇥ wL   dLU + (1  ↵) · r⇤  ,
where S˜ = S (1   ) ·r. Solving the first-order condition gives wL = dLU+  · S˜ (1   ) ·
(1  ↵) · r and wH is given by the IC-constraint. With extreme egalitarian preferences,
i.e. ↵ = 1, the equilibrium wage schedule is given by
wLel = d
L
U +   · S     · (1   ) · r,
wHel = d
H
S +   · S     · (1   ) · r + r.
illustrated by the el-dot in figure 5. When the union’s preferences are only slightly egali-
tarian, i.e. ↵ ⇡  , the total wage cost is approximately given by (1   ) ·wHNIC+  ·wLNIC .
This wage schedule lies on the IC-constraint slightly above the intersection with the ⇡NIC-






  ·  vL   wL + (1   ) ·  vH   wH ⇤1   ·⇥
(1   ) ·  wH   dHS  +   ·  wL   dLU ⇤  and the first-order condition for both wages
coincide and are given by    (1   ) ⇥  ·  vL   wL + (1   ) ·  vH   wH ⇤ 1 +    ·⇥
(1   ) ·  wH   dHS  +   ·  wL   dLU ⇤ 1 = 0.
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line in figure 5. For intermediate cases, ↵ 2 ( , 1), the equilibrium wage schedule lies on
the bold part of the IC-constraint. A higher ↵ leads to higher wages.
The intuition for why both premia and thus the total wage bill are increasing in ↵
is simply that the union is weakened by considering the eﬃciency wage premium r =
dLU  dLS > 0 as a gain in the negotiation. In the extreme case when ↵ = 1, the negotiation
is, in eﬀect, concerned with sharing a perceived surplus equal to S˜ = S   (1   ) · r
between a union receiving the unskilled premium wL   dLU and the employer receiving
S˜    wL   dLU . Since none of the parties care about the skilled workers’ welfare they
simply perceive the eﬃciency wage premium (1   ) · r as a cost of production that
should be deducted from S. When ↵ < 1, however, the eﬃciency wage premium is part
of the union’s payoﬀ.
In sum:
Lemma 4. Assume that an industry union organizes all workers in both basic and ad-
vanced jobs. If condition (9) is satisfied, the firm and the union will agree on an eﬃcient
wage schedule. If ↵ =  , any eﬃcient wage schedule such that the total wage bill is given
by (1   ) · wH +   · wL = (1   ) · wHNIC +   · wLNIC , is an equilibrium. If ↵ <  , the
equilibrium wage schedule is given by
wL = wLeh = d
L
U ,




r, 11   ·   · S
 
.
If ↵ >  , the equilibrium wage schedule is given by
wL = dLU +   · S˜   (1   ) · (1  ↵) · r,
wH = dHS +   · S˜ + r   (1   ) · (1  ↵) · r.
A formal proof is included in Stennek (2015).13
The industry-union’s choice of wage policy Before the collective bargaining starts,
the members of an industrial union must decide what wage policy the union should pursue.
The wage policy would be codified in oﬃcial documents but also embodied in the members’
choice of the union’s leadership, e.g. the chief wage negotiator. Here, the wage policy
is simply modeled as the union’s objective function, describing how the union values the
skilled and unskilled wages. The question is what weight ↵ the union should attach to
the unskilled workers’ wage.
13Condition (9) is needed to guarantee that the firm and the industry union would never choose a wage
schedule that leads to unemployment among the unskilled workers. This condition is superfluous in the
case of crafts unions since the union representing only the workers in basic jobs (the unskilled workers)
would never agree on such an outcome.
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As unions are democratic organizations, I assume that the wage policy is chosen to
maximize the utility of the workers with median productivity. Clearly, if the unskilled
workers would constitute the majority, an industry union would always pursue an egali-
tarian wage policy. But the evidence suggests that industrial unions emphasize the wages
of low-productive minorities . To understand this phenomenon within a two-type model,
I need to study the case when the median worker is skilled. For simplicity, I assume here
that the skilled workers only care for their own wage premium and that they do not care
for equity at all.
However, a wage negotiation is a strategic situation and the outcome is determined
through the interaction between the firm and the union. As Schelling (1960) pointed out,
even if union representatives are elected to maximize the utility of the median voter, the
most eﬀective representative need not share the principal’s preferences.
Figure 6 describes the the equilibrium wage premium earned by the two skill-groups as

















functions of the strength of the union’s equity concern. Clearly, the more the union cares
for the low-skilled workers, the (weakly) higher is their wage premium (figure 7a). More
interestingly, the relation between the union’s equity concerns and the skilled workers’
wage premium is non-monotonic (figure 7b). For low levels of equity concerns, the skilled
workers wage premium is (weakly) decreasing in equity concerns. In particular, the skilled
workers wage premium jumps down when increasing ↵ slightly above the threshold  .
After that, also the skilled workers’ wage premium is increasing in ↵.
Thus a completely self-interested skilled worker prefers one of the two extreme policies.
It is straight-forward to demonstrate that the wage in advanced jobs may be higher under
an extreme egalitarian wage policy (↵ = 1) than under a skill-biased wage policy (↵ = 0).
More precisely:
Lemma 5. An industry union pursues an extreme egalitarian wage policy if, and only if,
r > ✓ · 1
1    ·   · S, (15)
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where ✓ =  1  ·(1  ) < 1. Otherwise, the union pursues a skill-biased policy.
This result is illustrated by the fact that the el-dot is above the eh-dot in figure 5. In-
equality 15 is also assumed to hold in figure 6.14
5 Union formation
Before the collective wage negotiations begin, the workers have to organize. I assume that
all skilled workers join the same union and that all unskilled workers join the same union,
thus disregarding any collective action problems within the groups. Therefore, there will
either be an industry union organizing all workers, independent of what job they have, or
two separate crafts unions, one representing the workers in advanced jobs and the other
representing the workers in basic jobs. I assume that there will only be an industry union
if both types of workers prefer to join such a union to separate unions.
Consider first the possibility that collective negotiations with separate crafts unions
would result in an unconstrained equilibrium, as described by the circle in figure 8a. In





































case an industry union would pursue a skill-biased wage policy, i.e. ↵ <  , it would only
grant the unskilled workers a compensation for their disutility of work, as described by
the eh-dot. A separate crafts union, on the other hand, would grant the unskilled workers




14Stennek (2015) includes equity concerns. It is demonstrate that the skilled workers prefer an extreme
egalitarian wage policy if and only if the eﬃciency wage premium is large enough compared to the direct
bargaining premium. The more the skilled workers are concerned with equity, the lower is the requirement
on the eﬃciency wage premium.
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It follows immediately that the unskilled workers would not agree to form an industry
union that would set ↵ <  .
In case an industry union would pursue an egalitarian wage policy, i.e. ↵ >  , the
unskilled workers get a higher wage than under crafts unionism. For example, in the
extreme case when ↵ = 1, the unskilled workers can use the combined bargaining strength




as indicated by figure 8a.
What about the skilled workers? Recall that under the condition for strategic dele-
gation (15), skilled workers want an industry union to pursue an egalitarian wage policy,
i.e. wHel > wHeh. Also note that the skilled workers would get a higher wage by using the
combined strength of all workers than by bargaining separately, i.e.wHeh > wHNIC . Geomet-
rically this follows from the fact that the eh-dot is the midpoint between the e-dot and the
h-dot while wHNIC is the midpoint between the e-dot and the H-dot. Taken together these
inequalities imply that skilled workers prefer an industry union pursuing an egalitarian




Thus all workers have an incentive to form an industry union, when such a union would
pursue an egalitarian wage policy.
Actually the same results follow also in case separate unions would lead to some
“constrained equilibrium” described by the points on the thick line in figure 8b. Note
that both skilled and unskilled workers prefer an industry union pursuing an extreme
egalitarian wage policy to separate unions even if the most favorable equilibrium, i.e.




, would be selected. Also note that unskilled workers
would reject an industry union with ↵ <  .15
Thus:
Proposition 1. An industry union is formed if, and only if, it would pursue an egalitarian
wage policy.
15One might argue that the workers have an additional reason to form an industry union in case
separate unions would lead to a constrained equilibrium. It seems plausible that the firm which is
represented in both negotiations may have a strategic advantage in coordinating expectations on one of
the equilibria. They would then clearly choose the equilibrium with the lowest wage bill, i.e. wH = wHNIC




, as figure 8b is drawn. An industry union would eliminate any such strategic
advantage that the firm might enjoy with separate negotiations. (Even with this eﬀect in mind, the
unskilled workers would still not agree to a median-wage maximizing union.)
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The reason is that the workers in basic jobs prefer separate crafts unions, unless an
industry union would pursue an egalitarian wage policy. Thus, an egalitarian wage policy
is not only what an industry union will pursue but also part of the reason why such
egalitarian industry unions exist in the first place.
There is, however, an imperfection in the unionization process, from the workers’ point
of view. By asking for too much, the workers in advanced jobs may end up with less.
In particular, recall that the workers in basic jobs always prefer an egalitarian industry
union to crafts unions. Also the workers in advanced jobs would prefer an industry union
pursuing an egalitarian wage policy to a crafts union equilibrium (i.e. wHel > wHNIC) if,
and only if, the information rent is suﬃciently large,16
r > r ( ) ⌘  
1    ·
 
1    ·4S   0.
Recall, however, that the workers in advanced jobs would impose a median-wage policy,
rather than an egalitarian wage policy, in case an industry union is actually formed (i.e.
wHeh > w
H
el ) if, and only if, the information rent is suﬃciently small,
r < r ( ) ⌘ 1   




1    · S.
But, then, crafts unions are formed, since the workers in basic jobs would not join such
an industry union. Thus:
Proposition 2. The workers form crafts unions, even though they would all be better oﬀ
with an industry union pursuing an egalitarian wage policy if, and only if, the information
rent is moderate, r 2 (r ( ) , r ( )), and union bargaining power is suﬃciently low,
  <
1  4SS
1  (1   ) · 4SS
. (19)
Low bargaining power (inequality 19) is necessary and suﬃcient for r ( ) < r ( ).
It may be possible to somewhat reduce the discretionary powers of the majority
through the union charter, i.e. through the allocation of decision rights agreed when
the union is formed. Wage agreements may e.g. be subject to unanimous ratification by a
broadly composed board. But there are limits to how representative a board can be made.
And it is the union leadership that meets with the firm. The leadership has the initiative
and also more information about what can be achieved for the diﬀerent skill-groups in
16To prove this inequality, note first that if the crafts unions equilibrium would be constrained, i.e.
r > 11   ·  1   · 4S, the workers in advanced jobs would always be better oﬀ with an industry union
pursuing an egalitarian wage policy than they are with separate unions. Note, second, that in case the
crafts unions equilibrium would be unconstrained, i.e. r  11   ·  1   · 4S, the workers in advanced
jobs would be better oﬀ with an industry union pursuing an egalitarian wage policy than they are with
separate unions (i.e. wHel > wHNIC) if, and only if, r >
 
1   ·  1   ·4S.
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the negotiation. Absent a common interest, the least productive minority is thus at a
disadvantage in an industry union; a separate union may be preferred.
An industry union would also not be able to compensate the skilled workers for accept-
ing an egalitarian wage policy in case such a policy would increase the total wage share
but reduce the wage in advanced jobs. Even if side-payments would be possible, they
would weaken the ICS-constraint. That is, with side-payments, the firm may not need
to maintain the same wage diﬀerences to induce the skilled workers to select the more
advanced jobs. Then the whole eﬃciency gain from an egalitarian wage policy disappears.
6 Eﬀect of unions on wages
It is now time to study the eﬀect of unions on wages and to relate the theoretical results to
the empirical literature. Thus, the present section compares the equilibrium wages when
unions are present (  > 0) with the equilibrium wages when unions are absent (  = 0).





the wage diﬀerence is wHE   wLE = dHS   dLS .
An industry union always decreases wage inequality. To see this notice that an industry
union is formed given that it pursues an egalitarian wage policy. The equilibrium wages
are thus given by wLel = dLU +   · S˜ and wHel = dHS + r +   · S˜. Note that the skilled wage
is higher than the unskilled wage absent unions (  = 0). In particular, dHS + r > dLU
follows from dHS > dLS . The eﬀect of an industry union (  > 0) is to increase both wages
by the same amount. It follows that an industry union increases the unskilled wage more
than the skilled wage in percentage terms. Expressed diﬀerently, the relative wage (wHwL )
is reduced. (The relative wage, i.e. the diﬀerence in log-wages, is typically the focus of
empirical studies.)17
Proposition 3. An industry union increases all wages and reduces wage inequality.
This proposition may help to interpret the stylized facts about the wage eﬀects of unionism
referred to in the introduction.
When crafts unions are formed and the incentive-compatibility constraint does not
bind, i.e. when   ·4S > (1   ) · (1   ) · r, the equilibrium wages are given by wLNIC =








. It is easy to see that both wages are
increased and that wage inequality, in absolute terms, is increased, since
 
wHNIC   wLNIC
    wHE   wLE  =   · 11    ·4S   (1   ) · r > 0.
Numerical examples reveal that the relative wage (wHwL ) may be increased. When the
17Stennek (2015) demonstrates that the unskilled wage is increased more than the skilled wage also in
absolute terms, when unemployment is taken into account.
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incentive compatibility constrain binds in equilibrium, the eﬀect of unions is to increase
both wages by the same amount. The relative wage is then reduced.
Proposition 4. Crafts unions increase all wages and may increase or decrease wage
inequality.
Taken together, these propositions suggest that it is desirable to condition empirical stud-
ies of unions on their organizational form. They also provide a possible interpretation of
the pattern discovered by Ozanne (1962) in a study based on data for one particular firm
(a farm machine company) over the period 1858 to 1958. During this period the work-
ers were organized by many diﬀerent unions. Skill diﬀerentials narrowed during some
and widened during other regimes. Most interestingly, there was a general tendency for
industrial unions to lower skill diﬀerentials and for craft unions to raise them.
7 Collective bargaining over minimum wages
In large parts of Europe minimum wage levels are set through collective negotiations.
These negotiations occur at the national level between national unions and employers’
confederations, either industry by industry or for the country as a whole. In some countries
the collectively negotiated minimum wage is later established as law.18
In the wake of the economic crisis there has been some political pressure to lower min-
imum wages especially in Greece but also in other European countries including Sweden.
To understand what role minimum wages play in Europe, it is vital to first understand
how they are determined through the collective negotiations between the employers and
the unions. Unfortunately, however, almost all research on minimum wages concern coun-
tries such as the United States and Canada where minimum wages levels are determined
by lawmakers (Neumark and Wascher, 2007). The present model can be reinterpreted
and viewed as a first attempt to fill this gap.
Collective bargaining at the national level In a system with central collective
bargaining, national (or industry) negotiations precede local negotiations. The degree of
centralization varies depending on how detailed the central agreement is and how much is
delegated to the local negotiations. But to concentrate on the role of the minimum wage,
I assume that all other issues are decided locally. I assume that the central organizations
can foresee how the local wages are set, depending on what minimum wage they agree
18Collective bargaining is the dominant mode in Italy, Germany, Austria and the Nordic countries.
There, minimum wages are negotiated on an industry-by-industry basis. Also in Belgium, Greece, Estonia,
Poland and the Czech Republic the minimum wage levels are negotiated between the labor market parties.
But in these countries the agreed minimum wages are subsequently established as law, applicable for the
economy as a whole. Also in e.g. Ireland, Portugal and Spain the labor market parties play a role in the
determination of the legal minimum wage. See Skedinger (2012) for a closer description.
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upon. This assumption is supported by Hibbs’ and Locking’s (1996) finding that local
wage drift is accurately predicted and fully incorporated into central agreements. Since
I am interested in wage inequality at the firm level, I assume that all firms are identical
and that the central negotiation is conducted by an employers’ confederation which simply
maximizes the profit of the representative firm.
In order for the central negotiation to matter, the unions’ bargaining power must be
higher at the national level than it is at the local level. One reason why this may be so
is that wage costs are “taken out” of product market competition in central negotiations.
Another reason is that the parties are not permitted to resort to industrial actions (e.g.
strikes and lock-outs) during the term of the central agreement. Here, however, I will
simply assume that the union has some bargaining power at the central level (  > 0) but
that the employers can set wages unilaterally at the local level.
Thus, the model has two periods. First, the labor market parties agree on a minimum
wage (w) at the national level. Second, the local employers maximize profits by setting
wages (wL and wH) subject to the minimum wage.
In the second period, assuming that w   dLU , the firms set the wage for basic jobs at
the minimum wage, i.e. wL = w, and the wage for advanced jobs according to the incen-




. Assuming that the national union
maximizes the utility of the lowest paid workers (↵ = 1), national bargaining over the mini-
mum wage is represented by the Nash productNL (w) =
⇥
  · vL + (1   ) · vH   w   (1   ) · r⇤1  ·⇥
w   dLU
⇤ . Using the incentive constraint, the Nash product can be rewritten as
NL (w) =
h
S˜    w   dLU i1   · ⇥w   dLU⇤  ,
which is exactly the same bargaining problem as above (see expression ??). The above
solution can therefore be reinterpreted as the outcome of collective bargaining over mini-
mum wages at the national level.
A cap on minimum wages To assess the consequences of a cap on minimum wages,
consider figure 8. Absent the cap, an industry union pursuing an egalitarian wage policy
is formed. The outcome is represented by the el-dot.
Consider first the eﬀects of a “non-drastic” cap wˆ 2  ICLS  wHeh  , wLel . Then, the
equilibrium outcome is given by the intersection of the cap and the ICS-constraint. It
follows that both wages are lower than absent the cap (the el-dot) and that a tighter cap
moves the equilibrium down from the el-dot along the ICS-constraint.




. Then ICHS (wˆ) < wHeh.
For example, under the cap represented by a vertical line in figure 8, an industry union
pursuing an egalitarian wage policy can only achieve the wage schedule represented by
the black diamond. In such a case, the skilled workers prefer not to pursue an egalitarian
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wage policy (if it is strategically motivated). But then, crafts unions will be formed in
equilibrium.
Proposition 5. A cap on collectively negotiated minimum wages implies that all wages
are lower. If the cap is suﬃciently low, crafts unions are formed instead of an industry
union.
Consider now an economy with an industry union pursuing an egalitarian wage policy.
Assume that a drastic cap on minimum wages is suddenly imposed. Then, in the short
run, the whole equilibrium wage schedule is lowered from the el-dot to the black diamond.
Such a policy amounts to a so-called “internal devaluation,” i.e. a reduction of all blue-
collar wages. In the medium run, the industry union will, however, give up its egalitarian
wage policy. The wage schedule is moved from the black diamond to the eh-dot. The gist
of this change is to redistribute wages from the low skilled to the high skilled workers. In
the long run, the unskilled workers form a separate union. The wage schedule represented
by the circle is the new long-run equilibrium.19 Thus, a cap on minimum wages does
not only restrict the outcome of the collective negotiation. It has the potential to change
union goal-setting and even the pattern of unionization.
19It is possible that there are frictions that may delay the transformation of the organizational structure.
At first, individual low-skilled workers may simply leave the industry union, to avoid the union dues.
During this period while the low-skilled workers remain unorganized the equilibrium wage schedule moves
from the eh-dot towards the black square, gradually lowering the skilled wage. Then, the formation of a
new crafts union may be plagued by a collective action problem. It is also possible that the old industry





Since the purpose of this paper is to understand why some unions appear to favor their
least productive minorities, I have focused on the interaction between the union majority
and a low-productive minority. It also turns out that the relation between the majority
and a high-productive minority is less problematic. I will illustrate this point within the
simple two-type model already developed. When there is a minority of high-productive
workers and a majority of low-productive workers, the only change to the model is that
  > 12 .
A first observation is that an industry union would always pursue an egalitarian wage




S + r +   · [S   (1   ) · r] .
Note, however, that also the high-productive minority is guaranteed a part of the surplus.
In addition to wHE = dHS + r, they receive the same bargaining premium as the median-
productive workers (the third term on the right hand side). Thus, as a result of the
incentive compatibility constraint, a high-productive minority is never exposed to the
same degree of ex post opportunism by the majority as low-productive workers may be.
A second observation is that an industry union is also more easily formed when the
unskilled workers are in majority. Then, an industry union is formed if, and only if,
wHel > w
H
NIC . In contrast, when the skilled workers are in majority, an industry union is
formed if, and only if, both wHel > wHNIC and wHel > wHeh. Since wHeh > wHNIC , the condition
for industrial unionism is stricter in this case.
8.2 White-collar workers
The analysis may be extended to take into account that blue-collar workers compete with
white collar-workers for wages. Since the overall wage cost aﬀects firms’ pricing and output
decisions also the employment level is aﬀected. Thus there is an employment externality
between the blue- and the white-collar workers. If one group succeeds to increase its
wage level, demand for the other group is reduced, as blue- and white collar workers
are complements in production. The results show that if the blue-collar union adopts an
egalitarian wage policy (e.g. for strategic reasons) it will not only increase the wages of all
blue-collar workers, but it may also reduce the wages of white-collar workers. Thus, the
blue-collar union’s egalitarian wage policy does not only reduce wage inequality between
skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers, but also the wage diﬀerence between blue- and
white collar workers. These results are consistent with Freeman’s (1980) findings. I also
demonstrate that blue-collar unions are more inclined to pursue an egalitarian wage policy
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when part of the increased wage-cost is carried by the white-collar workers rather than
the employers.
An additional implication is that while a cap on minimum wages may reduce all blue-
collar workers wages, as demonstrated in the present paper, the total wage cost may not
be reduced by much, since white-collar wages may be increased when blue-collar wages
are reduced.
9 Concluding remarks
According to Kaufman (2002), the fundamental weak spot of the theory of trade unions is
our understanding of the unions’ goals and how these goals relate to both the institutional
structure of the unions and to the collective bargaining process itself. The empirical
literature suggests that unions have egalitarian preferences. In Stennek (2015) I argue
that the conflict between workers of diﬀerent skills may have been exaggerated. Fighting
for the lowest wages may be an eﬃcient strategy for industry unions to increase the
wages of all their members. In the present paper, I extend this analysis to show that
an egalitarian wage policy may also be a necessary and suﬃcient condition for workers
of diﬀerent skills to unite. Thus, an egalitarian wage policies is not only what industry
unions do, but also part of the reason why they exist in the first place.
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A Negotiation with skilled workers
To prove this claim, the Nash product has to be defined, assuming that wL 2 ⇥dLU , vL⇤.
If the employers and the skilled workers agree on some wage wH that satisfies the IC-
and right-to-manage constraints, wH 2 ⇥wHIC  wL  , vH⇤, the skilled workers will apply for
diﬃcult jobs. If not, they will apply for basic jobs (since wL   dLU < dLS). Therefore the
skilled workers’ utility is given by
UH =
8<: wH   dHSwL   dLS
if wH 2 ⇥wHIC  wL  , vH⇤
otherwise




vL   wL + (1   ) ·  vH   wH 
vL   wL
if wH 2 ⇥wHIC  wL  , vH⇤
otherwise
The employer’s profit increase from agreeing with the skilled workers is thus
 H⇡ =
8<: (1   ) ·
 
vH   wH 
(1   ) ·  vL   wL  if w
H 2 ⇥wHIC  wL  , vH⇤
otherwise
and the Nash product is given by
NH =  H⇡·UH =
8<:
⇥
(1   ) ·  vH   wH ⇤1   ·  wH   dHS   ⇥
(1   ) ·  vL   wL ⇤1   ·  wL   dLS  
if wH 2 ⇥wHIC  wL  , vH⇤
otherwise
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Both parties prefer an eﬃcient wage wH to a non-eﬃcient outcome if it satisfies
wH   dHS   wL   dLS
vH   wH   vL   wL
that is
wH    dHS   dLS + wL
wH   vH   vL + wL
Such a mutually preferred eﬃcient wage always exists since vH   vL   dHS   dLS by
inequality (2). Therefore, if the unconstrained maximization of NH yields a non-eﬃcient












the IC-constraint with equality. An even higher wage will not be considered since that
would reduce the (unconstrained) Nash product even further, as depicted by the figure.









B Negotiation with unskilled workers
Assume that wH 2 ⇥wHE , vH⇤ and note that the firm and the union for basic jobs would
never agree on a wage outside the interval wL 2 ⇥dLU , vL⇤, as such wages would make the
unskilled workers unemployed (recall that dHU is extremely high) without changing the
skilled workers’ incentives.
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If the employers and the unskilled workers agree on some wage wL 2 ⇥dLU , vL⇤ for basic
jobs, the unskilled workers’ utility is given by
UL = w
L   dLU .





=    dHS   dLS + wH .




, the skilled workers
will apply for diﬃcult jobs. If not, they will apply for basic jobs. Therefore the employer’s




vL   wL + (1   ) ·  vH   wH 
vL   wL
if wL  wLIC
otherwise





  ·  vL   wL + (1   ) · ⇥ vL   wL    vH   wH ⇤ if w
L  wLIC
otherwise





   · ⇥  ·  vL   wL ⇤1   
wL   dLU
   ·   vL   wL   (1   ) ·  vH   wH  1   if w
L  wLIC
otherwise






vL + dLU   2wL
  
vL + dLU   2wL
   (1   ) ·  vH   wH  if w
L  wLIC
otherwise
The derivative is monotonically decreasing in wL except at wLIC where the derivative jumps
up (see figure 11c) or down (see figure 11b), depending on the circumstances.





Clearly wLNIC is a local maximum of the Nash product if, and only if, if wLNIC  wLIC .
The “lower part” of the Nash product (corresponding to a non-eﬃcient outcome) takes on
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Moreover, since wH  vH it follows that wLne  wLNIC . There are then three possibilities
1. wLne  wLNIC  wLIC
2. wLne  wLIC  wLNIC
3. wLIC  wLne  wLNIC
In the first case wLNIC but not wLne is a local maximum of the Nash product. As revealed
by figure 11a, wLNIC is then also the unique global maximum. In the third case wLne but not
wLNIC is a local maximum of the Nash product. As revealed by figure 11b and figure 11c,
wLne is then also the unique global maximum. In the second case, neither wLNIC nor wLne is
a local maximum. As revealed by figure 11d, wLIC is then the unique global maximum.
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Since wL depends on wH we need to think about this relationship as a best-reply function.
This best-reply function is illustrated in the figure in the main text.
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